Concepts / Institutions
Selectorate theory.
Every leader needs support to stay in power, but the number of supporters they truly need varies widely. Selectorate theory argues that this number shapes how leaders govern: whether they reward a small circle, or provide policies that benefit everyone.
The theory was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), and set out for a general audience in The Dictator's Handbook (2011) by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith.
How it works
Three circles and a budget.
The theory divides a society into nested groups, and asks what a leader must do to keep the innermost one on side.
- 01
The population
Everyone who lives under the leader's authority.
- 02
The selectorate
Those with a real say, formal or informal, in choosing the leader.
- 03
The winning coalition
The supporters whose backing the leader cannot do without.
- 04
The rewards
With a small coalition, rewarding a few directly is cheapest. With a large one, policies that benefit everyone work better.
Why it matters
Incentives, not only character.
The theory suggests that the size of the coalition, more than any leader's personal qualities, can shape how resources are spent. It also offers an explanation for why some leaders can survive poor performance. When the coalition is small and the selectorate large, supporters have much to lose: their privileges depend on the leader staying in office, and a rival would be unlikely to include them. The theory calls this the loyalty norm. Try it in the graphic: compare the chance of a place in a rival's coalition when everyone has a say and when only a few do.
Where it can show up
Wherever someone must keep a coalition together.
These are general patterns described by the theory, not findings about any particular party, country, leader or election.
Public services
In the theory, systems with broad coalitions tend to spend more on public goods such as schooling, health and clean water.
Organisations
A chief executive answerable to a small board can face different incentives from one answerable to many members or shareholders.
Associations and local bodies
Who chooses the leadership of a council, union or club can shape whether it serves its members broadly.
Reforms
Changes that widen the circle of people a leader must answer to can shift that leader's incentives.
Using the idea carefully
Questions to ask of any system.
The theory is a lens for asking better questions, not a verdict on any system.
- Who has a say in choosing the leader, on paper and in practice?
- Whose support is essential, and roughly how many people is that?
- Do resources flow mainly to a few, or to everyone?
- How easily could a supporter be replaced, and what would they lose?
- What would widen the circle of people that leaders must answer to?
Origins and further reading
Where the idea comes from.
The theory is influential and also debated. Critics have questioned how well its two key groups can be measured, and whether its tests separate coalition size from democracy itself.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M. and Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Smith, A. (2011). The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. PublicAffairs.
- Clarke, K. A. and Stone, R. W. (2008). Democracy and the logic of political survival. American Political Science Review, 102(3), 387–392.
About this concept
A general idea, not a verdict.
This page explains a general concept from political science. It does not describe or assess any particular party, country, government, leader or election. Related: The principal–agent problem and Dominance can hide decline.